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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
INTHEMATTER OF THE ADOPTION I 
OF Case No. 7864 
SALLY ANN DRUCE, A Minor. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
On October 23, 1951 Sheldon A. Jacobsen and Ruby H. 
Jacobsen, his wife, through their attorneys, Young, Young and 
Sorensen filed their pettiion in the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District, in and for Utah County, State of Utah, peti-
tioning the court for the adoption of Sally Ann Druce, a minor 
of the age of three years, which child was born issue of the 
marriage of Charles R. Druce and Merlyn Druce, and was 
born on the 20th day of April, 1948 (Tr. 3). That on the same 
day said petition was filed in said court, the mother of said 
minor child, Merlyn Druce, appeared in court and signed a 
consent for the adoption of said child. 
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That while said petition was still pending, the Appellant, 
and mother of said child, Merlyn Druce filed her answer to 
the petition of Respondents on the 9th day of February, 1952, 
alleging therein that said petition for adoption fails to state 
facts, or a claim upon which relief can be granted. Admitting 
that said child is a minor or the age of three years and that 
she is the child of Appellant, Merlyn Druce, and that said 
child is in the custody of Respondents and has resided in their 
home for eleven months, and. did further admit and deny other 
allegations in said petition for adoption, which is revealed by 
said answer of appellant to said petition. 
That on March the 8th, 1952, Appellant served and .filed 
an amended answer to petiion for adoption by the said respond-
ents of the said child Sally Ann Druce in which she admits 
that said petitioners are husband and wife and that they have 
resided in Provo and their respective ages and are citizens 
of the United States and that the said minor -child was born 
on the 20th day of April, 1948 in Salt Lake County, Utah and 
that said minod child has resided with respondents for several 
months last past. 
She further admits that she did at one time give her con-
sent to the adoption of said minor child by respondents, but 
under circumstances which she sets forth further in said amend-
ed answer and she further denies that it is for the best interest 
of said minor child to be adopted by respondents. 
In paragraph one of her affirmative defense to said peti-
tion she alleges that· said petition of respondents fails to state 
facts, or a claim upon which the relief claimed for by respond-
ents can be granted. 
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In paragraph 2 of said affirmative defense she alleges the 
birth of said minor child as the issue of the marriage of herself 
and Charles A. Druce and in paragraph 3 of said affirmative 
defense she alleges that shortly after the birth of said child 
the father of said minor child deserted and abandoned the 
Appellant and has remained away ever since and has done 
nothing for the support of herself and said minor child and 
is in the military service of the United States, and because of 
her financial condition she was compelled to place said minor 
child with her maternal grandparent with whom she was 
residing and that she did assist her grandmother in caring for 
said minor child, but due to some differences she had with 
her grandmother she was compelled to leave the home of 
her grandmother and did leave the child with said grand-
parent, and that Appellant did take said child later and place 
same in a day nursery, and that said grandparent did, without 
the consent of Appellant take said child from said day nursery 
and place the same with respondents to care for said minor 
child. 
In paragraph 4 of said affirmative answer appellant 
alleges that because of her financial condition and her emo-
tional upsets and the constant persuasions of the attorney 
for respendents to get her to consent to the adoption of said 
minor child, and advising her that it was for the best interests 
of said minor child, she did give her consent in writing to 
the adoption of said minor child. 
In paragraph 5 of said affirmative defense, she alleges 
that since she did give her consent to the adoption of said 
minor child, her financial condition has changed for the better 
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and she was then in a position to properly provide for said 
minor child and therein did revoke her consent to the adoption 
of said minor child by said respondents and that she is a fit and 
proper person to have the custody of said minor child and 
so prays the court to permit her to revoke her consent for 
the adoption of said minor child and have said child returned 
to her. 
Respondents filed their reply to said amended answer of 
Appellant in which they deny that the consent for adoption 
obtained from said Appellant was obtained by persuasion 
or coercion on the part of respondents and that it is for the 
best interests of said minor child to have respondents adopt 
it and generally admit the allegations in said affirmative 
defense set forth save and except that they deny that the said 
Appellant is in a financial condition to properly care for said 
child and that she has a right to rescind her consent for the 
adoption of said minor child by respondents, or that she is 
a fit and proper person to care for said minor child. 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the matter was set for trial 
before the court on the 24th day of March, 1952, and the 
parties thereto being present with their respective counsel 
and their witnesses and a trial was had thereon and on the 30th 
day of April, 1952 the court rendered its decision and con-
cluded that respondents had in all ways complied with the 
statutory requirements having to do with the adoption of said 
minor child and that they were fit and proper persons to adopt 
said minor child. 
That said Appellant did on the 23rd day of October, 1951 
freely and voluntarily give her consent in open court for the 
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adoption of her child by said respondents and that no undue 
influence or coercion was used on Appellant to induce her 
to give said consent for adoption. 
That Appellant's moral behavior has not changed since 
October 2}, 1951 and her financial condition has not improved 
since that time. 
That it is for the best interests of said child to have said 
respondents adopt said minor child. 
That the father of said minor child has now given his 
consent for the adoption of said minor child by said petitioners. 
That the court did make and enter its findings of fact 
in conformity therewith, and entered its decree accordingly. 
From said findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
decree of the court the mother of said minor child, Merlyn 
Druce, takes this appeal. 
The evidence in this case respectfully shows that Merlyn 
Druce, Appellant herein, has resided with her grandmother 
most of her life, her mother having died when she was six 
years old and she never knew her father (Tr. 28). That in 
1947 she married one Charles Druce and that she lived with 
him only three months when they separated. They went back 
to live together intermittently until the child in question, 
Sally Ann Druce, was born on April 20, 1948. That there-
after the said Charles A. Druce lived with Appellant for 
about three weeks and then left her and has not lived with 
her since (Tr. 29). Appellant then went back to live with 
her grandmother and took the child with her. Her husband 
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has never contributed to the support of Appellant of their 
child since its birth with the exception of buying the child a 
dress on its first birthday and some little groceries (Tr. 52). 
Appellant then went back to live with her grandmother 
and took her child with her. The child remained with the 
grandmother for amout two years, when said child was placed 
with respondents at Provo, Utah, for them to care for her 
( T r. 30) . The child was placed with respondents by the 
grandmother because the grandmother felt she could no longer 
care for the child and the respondents consented to take and 
care for the child. The child was placed with respondents 
without the knowledge or consent of the Appellant and she 
did not know the child was with respondents until January, 
1951 (Tr. 30-31). 
During the time appellant and her child were living with 
her grandmother she did what she could to repay her grand-
mother for her confinement expenses and the support of the 
child, but due to her financial condition she was compelled 
to impose upon her grandmother to take care of the child 
(Tr. 30). 
There was apparently no arrangements made or any 
understanding had with the Appellant for the adoption of 
this child at that time, nor at any time, until the appellant 
was persuaded and coerced by the attorney for respondents 
and the respondents themselves, to give her consent to the 
adoption of this child. The child lived in the home of the 
respondents for some eleven months and they decided they 
wanted to adopt the child and then took the steps to persuade 
the appellant to give her consent to this adoption. 
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In January, 1951, Mr. Young, respondents' attorney, called 
on Appellant and advised her that respondents wanted to 
adopt the child and had to have her consent and that it was 
for the child's benefit to have them adopt her. Appellant 
then stated that she would not give her consent to adopt the 
child (Tr. 31). 
Within the next three weeks Mr. Young called on Ap-
pellant several times trying to persuade her to sign the consent 
for the adoption of this child and in response to the following 
questions she replied (Tr. 32-33): 
Q. Was it in Salt Lake or Provo? 
A. Yes, it was in Salt Lake. 
Q. All right, what took place then? 
A. Well, again he asked me if I would sign the adop-
tion papers. Told me that it was selfish of me to want 
to deprive Sally of the things I couldn't give her 
because I didn't have the money or means. 
Q. What did you say to him? 
A. I wouldn't sign them then. 
After this refusal, Mr. Young kept coming to see Ap-
pellant and trying to persuade her to sign her consent to this 
adoption (Tr. 33-34-35). 
Q. You didn't have a home for Sally at that time, did 
you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Now, when did you see him again? 
A. I believe I came down to Provo with him again. 
Q. Did he come up to get you? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. For what purpose? 
A. To bring me down here. 
Q. What was your conversation with him then? 
A. The same thing, why wouldn't I sign, because it 
\vas better for Sally and better for me, and that 
I had nothing to give her, nothing to offer her. 
Q. Pursuant to that what did you do? 
A. I still did not sign. I said I probably would because 
I didn't have a place to take her, it was true, and 
I said I would consent to-I would think it over. 
Q. About how long after that when you came to 
Provo and he took you back was it that you saw 
him again at your home in Salt Lake, if you know? 
A. About three months. 
Q. What was said then? 
A. Oh, I consented to sign the papers then, and we 
came down to Provo, and I came in this very same 
room I think, I believe, I don't know, and signed 
the papers. 
Q. And did you sign them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you necessarily sign them? 
A. Because I didn't feel I could take care of Sally. 
Mr. Young, respondents' attorney, worked on appellant 
trying to get her to give her consent to this adoption over a 
period of a year (Tr. 52). 
Q. Now, about how many times did Mr. Young come 
10 
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to see you regarding the adoption of this child 
and getting the consent? 
A. About five times. 
Q. Over a period of a year? 
A. Over a period of a year. 
Besides the efforts of Mr. Young, appellant's family 
used their influence upon appellant trying to get her to give 
her consent to this adoption, and she refused. Upon cross-
examination appellant testified (Tr. 45): 
Q. You didn't tell them you had been coerced into 
consenting, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. You told them you thought it was for the best in· 
terest of the child that be done, didn't you? 
A. I told them I couldn't fight because I didn't have 
the money to fight with, no place to take Sally. 
Q. And at that time didn't you tell them that you had 
no place to take the child and you weren't even 
going to contest the adoption matter? 
A. I told them I wasn't in any position to do anything. 
(Tr. 48). 
Q. What yid you tell them? 
A. I remember that they came up and we were talking 
outside in the car and they wanted to know what 
I was going to do, just what I was going to do, 
and I said I didn't know, I wasn't in any position 
to say anything or do anything. (Tr. 48). 
Again on redirect examination appellant testified as fol-
lows (Tr. 50): 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Mrs. Druce, when you appeared in court to sign 
this consent what remark was made by Mr. Young 
after the consent was signed about obtaining this 
consent? 
A. Well, I remember that Mr. Young was awfully 
glad to get it and he had been working some time 
on it, and he said he had been working some time, 
if you remember, Mr. Young; and I believe it is 
the same Judge, and you said, "Well, I have been 
a year or approximately a year on this, I should 
get a thousand dollars for it." 
Q. Now, did anybody else use any persuasions or in-
fluence upon you to sign this consent? 
A. Why, of course, they were after me from January, 
1951 until I signed the consent. 
Appellant was persuaded and coerced by all of her rela-
tives, her grandmother, Mr. Young and the respondents, to 
permit the respondents to adopt this child. Although appellant 
loved her child, she was not in a position financially to properly 
care for the child at that time and because of her financial 
position and her emotional upset by being continually harassed 
to give her consent she did so, but the evidence clearly shows 
that it was not willingly done (Tr. 51-52-53). The grand-
mother was tired of caring for the child and she was desirous 
of being relieved of this burden and did all she could to get 
the child adopted out. To confirm this fact Mrs. Jacobsen was 
asked as follows (Tr. 83): 
Q. And you didn't know when you took the child 
whether you could adopt the child or not, did you? 
A. No, we did not. 
Q. You weren't even-promised you could? 
12 
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A. The grandmother promised us if Merly didn't come 
back and help to raise her that she would do every-
thing in her power to help us adopt her. 
The appellant was recalled to the stand and testified as 
follows (Tr. 124-125): 
Q. Did you have a talk with Mrs. Jacobsen before you 
signed this consent with relation to whether there 
could be trouble or she was going to fight you if 
you didn't sign this consent? 
A. I was told by my grandmother that it would be 
impossible for me to take Sally Ann out of the Jacob-· 
sen home before this consent was ever signed. I 
was told I couldn't take her without signing it be-
cause of my past actions. 
Q. Now, you heard the testimony, Merlyn, about them 
coming up to the place where you lived and talking 
with you in the automobile? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did they say then about creating some trouble 
for you? 
A. They said-well, this is just the exact words, "If 
there is any trouble we will just have to put you 
in jail, that's all," because of this bigamist position 
I am supposed to be living in or was at that time 
they supposed. And I stated I wasn't in any position 
to make them any trouble really, but I told Mrs. 
Gudmundson at the time that I did want Sally, 
that I did want her, but I didn't see how I could 
fight anyone with any money, or I didn't know 
what to do. I just didn't know what to do, I said. 
Q. But they did tell you you would go to jail if you 
attempted to fight this case? 
A. They said, "Well, you couldn't make too much 
1? 
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trouble, Merlyn, because we would just have to 
put you in jail, that's all." 
Respondents, through their respective witnesses, including 
the grandmother of appellant and her sister have attempted 
to show that appellant was not a fit and proper person to have 
the custody of this child and in support of this proposition 
testified that appellant was never attentive to her child and 
did not come home to care for the child or visit with it 
only seldomly and her conduct was such by way of drinking 
beer and staying out late at nights and on one occasion was 
supposed to have been caught in a compromising position with 
a boy friend she was going with (Tr. 121). This was by 
her half sister, but appellant denied this (Tr. 125-126). There is 
little evidence in the whole record to show that appellant is an 
unfit mother to have her child. She was in unfortunate circum-
stances and a victim of such, but there is no evidence produced 
by respondents to show that she was an unfit person or unfit 
to have her child. 
At the time appellant signed the consent for the adoption 
of her child, she met a young man by the name of Jack Farrer 
who wanted to marry her, and she, acting under a misappre-
hension about her marriage to Charles Druce, went through 
a marriage ceremony with the said Jack Farrer and lived with 
him a short while, until it was brought to her attention that 
she was still the wife of Charles Druce. Her own husband, 
Charles Druce, and her grandmother likewise led her to be-
lieve she was not married to Charles Druce (Tr. 56-57-58). 
Appellant testified that she was under age when she 
married Charles Druce and her grandmother objected very 
14 
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much to it. That after they came home and separated the 
grandmother would not let Charles Druce come to her home 
to see the appellant or his baby (Tr. 56). She further testified 
that she was under the impression she was not married to 
Charles Druce as follows: 
Q. Now, Mrs. Druce, after you married Mr. Druce and 
you came back home, what took place between 
you and your grandmother about this marriage? 
A. Grandmother and I fought about the marriage 
to begin with. . . etc. 
Q. I am talking about, Mrs. Druce, with relation to 
the validity of your marriage to him. 
A. I was under the impression until we found out 
that I wasn't married to him. 
Q. What led you to that impression, what facts ? 
A. The fact that he told me I wasn't. That is why I 
never got any money out of him. And that it is just 
all mixed up, he told me I wasn't married to him, 
and between him and my folks I didn't know what 
it was, where I stood. 
Q. What did your grandmother do about your mar-
riage? 
A. Grandmother had me to an attorney at one time; 
I don't know his name, I don't remember. 
Q. Did she tell you you weren't married to Charlie? 
A. Not actually come right out and tell me. 
Q. Did she tell you she had procured an annullment? 
A. Yes, she said she was going to have one. 
Q. When you went through this marriage ceremony 
with Mr. Farrer, were you under the impression 
at that time you were not married to Charlie? 
15 
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A. I was under the impression that I wasn't. 
Q. When did you find out to the contrary? 
A. The date, it was the 15th of February, around the 
15th of February. 
Q. What was the occasion for your finding that out? 
A. I wanted to withdraw my consent to this adoption. 
The people dug into it and found out, and my 
mother-in-law, Jack's mother phoned to Elko and 
found out that the marriage was good. 
Appellant further testified that since she found out her 
marriage to Farrer was not good she did everything she could 
to procure a divorce from her husband, Charles Druce, so 
that should could properly marry Jack Farrer. That Charles 
Druce was in the army and he would do nothing toward assist-
ing her by letting her get a divorce. That she had tried to 
contact him to get him to sign a waiver, but she could not 
find him, nor would his people tell her where he was, and 
they finally informed her that her husband was not interested 
and he would not do anything about it. Druce later came home 
at the time of this hearing and he still would not do anything 
to let her have a divorce. He was in the army and she could 
not sue him unless he signed a waiver. She further testified 
that the said Jack Farrer wanted to properly marry her and 
that he was earning sufficient to care for her and the baby and 
provide a home for them (Tr. 57-58). 
Pursuant to the foregoing the court took the matter under 
advisement and later rendered its judgment, denying to the 
appellant her right to withdraw her consent to the adoption. 
That no undue influence or coercion was used upon appellant 
16 
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to obtain her consent, and she had freely and voluntarily 
gave her consent to the adoption; that it is for the best in-
terests of said child that she be adopted by the respondents 
and accordingly entered its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and decree herein (Tr. 142-143.-144-145-146-147-148-
149-150). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE OBJECTION 
OF APPELLANT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY 
EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE PETITION OF RESPONDENTS 
DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE 
THE PETITIONERS TO RELIEF. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CARE AND CUSTODY 
OF HER MINOR CHILD, SALLY ANN DRUCE. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS 
JUDGMENT THAT THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY 
17 
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AND WITHOUT COERCION, DURESS OR PERSUASION 
GAVE HER VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PETITIONERS 
FOR THE ADOPTION OF HER MINOR CHILD. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS 
JUDGMENT DENYING THE RIGHT OF THE APPEL-
LANT TO WITHDRAW HER CONSENT FOR ADOP-
TION OF HER MINOR CHILD BY RESPONDENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE OBJECTION 
OF APPELLANT TO THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY 
EVIDENCE ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS FOR 
THE REASON THAT THE PETITION OF RESPONDENTS 
DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ENTITLE 
THE PETITIONERS TO RELIEF. 
At the time of trial and before any evidence was intro-
duced in said matter the appellant, by her counsel, objected 
to the introduction of any evidence in said matter for the 
reason that the petition of respondents did not state facts 
sufficient to entitle the petitioners to relief, and upon the 
further grounds that the appallant had the right to withdraw 
her consent to said adoption· at any time before the adoption. 
The court overruled this objection and proceeded to trial. 
18 
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Section i4-4-4 U.C.A. 1943, CONSENT TO ADOPTION. 
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child 
without the consent of its mother, if living, except that 
consent is not necessary from a father or mother who 
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child 
on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion;" 
At the time of filing the petition for adoption and hearing 
had thereon no consent was obtained from the father of this 
child to this adoption and appellant had withdrawn her 
consent and the court could not proceed to hear this adoption 
without the petitioners complying with the foregoing provisions 
of the Statute and the court should have sustained the ob-
jection of the appellant to any hearing on this petition, be-
cause it did not comply with the statute in alleging the 
consent of the parents of said child, nor did it allege that 
the father of said child had been judicially deprived of the 
custody of said child on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion. 
The only allegation therein contained was to the effect that 
the father, shortly after the marriage of appellant and the 
father of said child, deserted and abandoned it, and that 
petitioners had made diligent search to find him. Nor does 
the reply of petitioners therein filed cure any defects of the 
petition in setting forth the necessary allegations as required 
by the statute. 
Aside from the foregoing the objections were further 
contended for upon the principle and the law, that a parent 
of a minor child could withdraw her consent to the adoption, 
although previously given, at any time before the adoption 
of said child, and that the consent, even though it was obtained 
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voluntarily and without undue influence, coercion or persua-
sion, could be withdrawn by the parent, and that the appel-
lant had ·;withdrawn her consent to said adoption and notified 
the petitioners of this fact before any hearing had hereon 
or before any proceedings for adoption was had in this matter 
and expressly withdrew her consent for adoption in her 
amended answer to said petition (Tr. 13). 
In support of the foregoing contention the following 
authorities are cited: 
183 N. W. 956. Minn. 
"Appellants could not adopt the child without ob-
taining respondent's consent. Section 7153, G. S. 1917 
Supp. Her refusal to consent still left the child in ap-
pellant's custody. They base their right to retain the 
custody of her agreement with them and on the claim 
that it is for the best interest of the child that it be 
left with them. 
"The written agreement created no binding obliga-
tions respecting the custody of the child. State v. An-
derson, 198 N. W. 681; State v. Armstrong, 169 N.W. 
249; State v. Pelowski, 177 N.W. 627. 
248 N. W. 657, Minn. 
"Even if it could be assumed that in the distress of 
her unmarried motherhood she contemplated abandon-
ment, it was but a fleeting impulse. If at one time there 
was temporary consent by her, it was withdrawn be-
fore commencement of this proceeding. Such a consent 
once given, may be withdrawn at any time before adop-
tion. State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley, 183 N.W. 956. 
2 C. ]. S. Page 386, Par. 4. 
"Consent may be withdrawn at any time before adop-
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tion, even though given in writing, and accompanied 
by transfer of the custody of the child, and even though 
the natural parent had abandoned the child; and an 
adoption based upon a consent that has been with-
drawn is void." 
7 Pa. Dist. & Co. 139, Herbert v. Anderson . 
"Until a legal adoption has been affected, a consent 
may be revoked, even though the child has been placed 
wtih a welfare agency with a view to its adoption by 
others.'' 
Nelms et ux, v. Birkland et ux., 279 Pac. 748. Washington. 
"Without a statute or without compliance with a 
statute, there is no such thing in our law as the adop-
tion of an heir. Adoption was not known to the com-
mon law, and is a matter purely statutory. Courts 
have passed upon this question frequently, and have 
adhered with much strictness to this rule. (Citing 
authorities. 
"The mother in this case expressly gave a written 
consent, and the claimed right of adoption was . based 
on that. From the facts stated and from others that 
appear in the record, it is clear that , prior to the time 
that the petition for adoption was first filed, the writ-
ten consent given by the mother had been revoked, 
and this she had a right to do prior to the time that a 
legal adoption was made, assuming, without so decid-
ing, that the written consent satisfied the requirement 
of the statute. In 1 C. J. P. 1378, it is said: 
"A natural parent, by entering into a contract for 
the adoption of his child by another, waives his right 
to the custody and control of the child; but, subject 
to his liability to be sued for breach of his contract, 
he may revoke his gift and resume custody of his child 
at any time before a legal adoption has been made." 
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"The written consent having been revoked, it is 
plain that the necessary statutory requirement to enable 
the court to enter a legal order of adoption has not 
been complied with. The extinguishment of the rights 
of the natural parents to the custody and control of 
their child is not a matter of discretion on the part 
of the court. Before the natural parents' right to the 
custody and control of their child can be extinguished, 
the statutory requirements must be complied with. If 
the statutory requirements are complied with then 
it becomes a matter of discretion as to the propriety 
of the proposed adoption, and the question of the moral, 
ilntellectual, and material welfare of the child becomes 
a matter for the court to take into consideration. In 
Re Lease, 99 Wash. 413, 417, 169 Pac. 816, 817, it is 
said: 
"The legal parentage of a child is not and cannot 
be lawfully changed under our laws, as a matter of 
the court's discretion, in so far as the consent of the 
minor's parents is concerned. Until the consent of both 
living parents is given in the manner provided by 
our statute above quoted, or it is clearly shown that 
such consent is unnecessary, because of the existence 
of conditions specified in the statute, the court has no 
discretion to act in the matter at all." 
"The written consent in the present case having been 
revoked prior to the time that any legal action took 
place, and there being no other conditions which would 
authorize the court to extinguish the rights of the 
natural parents to the custody and control of their 
child, there is no legal basis under the statute to sus-
tain the adoption order." 
State ex rel. Towne et ux. vs. Superior Court of Kitsap 
County et al. 165 Pac. 2d. 862. Washington. 
"On November 10, 1944, Irene Vinsant gave her 
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written consent to Mack S. Kaliszewski and his wife, 
Sylvia M. Kaliszewski, for the adoption of the child. 
On January 26, 1945, while adoption proceedings in-
stituted by the Kaliszewskis w.ere pending, she revoked 
her consent given on November 10, 1944. That she 
had the legal right and power to revoke the consent 
she had given is not questioned." 
Williams et u..~, v. Capparelli, 175 Pac. 2d 153. Oregon. 
"It is the general rule that a natural parent who 
has consented to the adoption of a child in compliance 
with a statute which makes such consent a prerequisite 
to adoption may effectively withdraw or revoke his 
consent at any time before the court has made a decree 
of adoption. 44 No. E 2nd 113; 124 S. W. 2d 420; 
1 N. W. 2d 579; 279 N. Y. S. 427; 33 N. Y. S. 2d 
793; 60 N. Y. S. 2d 421; 279 Pac. 748. A few holding 
to the contrary appear to have been based upon the 
provisions of the particular statutes under considera-
tion." 
"Nevertheless, it would seem that courts should not 
interfere with the natural relationship of parent and 
child upon the sole ground that the proposed adoptive 
parents are able to give the child superior advantages 
over those within the means or social status of the 
natural parents. State v. Beardsley, 183 N. W. 956." 
"A text writer has suggested that some of the more 
recent decisions have shown a tendency on the part of 
the courts to deny the right of a parent to withdraw 
consent to adoption before final decree, if the consent 
was given voluntarily with a full understanding of 
every fact necessary thereto. 2 C. J. S. Par. 21 Adoption 
of children. It will be seen however from a study of the 
cases cited in support of the text, (and relied upon by 
petitioners herein) that the rule under which a parent 
is permitted to withdraw consent before final decree, 
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has not been departed from, but rather that in the 
case scited matters of equitable estoppel were invoked 
asainst the parent." 
In Re White's adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N. W. 2d 
579. ( 1940). 
"Appellants contend that Marcena White, the nat-
ural mother, could not withdraw her consent at the time 
it was attempted without showing fraud and duress 
in the procurement thereof. While this question has 
not been squarebly before us, it has been raised in 
various proceedings in other jurisdictions. In Minne-
sota, it has been held that the mother's consent may 
be revoked at any time before the child is legally 
adopted, State ex rel. Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 
435; 183 N. W. 956. In Washington it is held that 
adoption is a contract between the parties but that a 
natural parent may revoke his consent at any time be-
fore a legal adoption has been made, subject to his 
liability to be sued for breach of contract, and that 
when the written consent is once revoked, the neces-
sary consent being absent, such an order cannot be 
made. In re Nelms, 153· Wash. 242, 279 P. 746. See 
also, Fitts v. Carpenter, Tex. City App. 124 S. W. 
2d 420. In the case at bar, the probate judge stated no 
reason for setting aside the original order, and the 
record before us contains none of the testimony taken 
either in the probate court or in the circuit court on 
the appeal. Without a record disclosing what reasons 
impelled the mother to withdraw her consent, we have 
no occasion to pass upon the question whether such 
reasons were sufficient, if indeed any stated reason 
is necessary beyond the mere fact she had changed her 
mind. It is our opinion that under the circumstances 
of this case, no vested rights have intervened, the natural 
mother had the right to withdraw her consent to the 
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adoption during the ninety days while the probate 
court still had control over the matter by rehearing." 
In the annotation to the foregoing case (130 ALR 1030) 
the majority and minority rules as to withdrawal of consent by 
the natural parent is thus stated ( 1038-39): 
"The rule in a majority of the jurisdictions wherein 
the question has arisen is that a natural parent's con-
sent to the proposed adoption of a child, duly given 
in compliance with a statute requiring such consent as 
a prerequisite to an adoption may be effectively with-
drawn or revoked by the natural parent before the 
adoption has been finally approved and decreed by 
the court, Re White (Mich.) (Reported herewith) 
anto, 1034; Re Nelms (1929) 153 Wash. 242, 279 
Pac. 740. And see State ex rel Platzer v. Beardsley 
(1921) 149 Minn. 435, 183 N. W. 956; Re Anderson 
( 1933) 189 Minn. 85, 248 N. W. 657; Fitts v. Carpen-
ter (1939) Tex. Civ. App. 124 S. W. 2d 420. 
French v. Catholic League, 60 Ohio 442, 144 N.E. 2d 113. 
"Why should such an unfortunate mother not be 
permitted to revoke her prior consent for relinquish-
ment when she has not been advised of its acceptance 
and it has not yet been acted upon? . . . She might 
have been destitute and shortly thereafter acquired an 
inheritence and an ability to care for her offspring. 
Must she adopt her own child? Surely, she being a 
suitable person, it would have been a cruel thing for 
a society devoted to the welfare of children to say 
you cannot reclaim your given word and have back 
your child." 
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The facts show that the mother of an infant child gave 
her consent to its adoption and petitioner, Mrs. Fitzgibbons, 
filed her petition to adopt the child based on said consent of 
the mother. The mother then appeared, objected and with-
drew her consent before a decree was entered. The court, in 
allowing the withdrawal said: 
"This appellant having appeared and objected to 
the adoption of her child, her consent thereto thereto-
fore given for its adoption, became ineffectual." 
The court found in that case that the mother had aban-
doned the child and proceedings for decree of adoption were 
filed in 1945 after a consent had been given in 1938 and the 
mother evidenced little or no interest in the child during 
~even years. 
Re McDonnell's Adoption 176 Pac. 2d 778. California. 
"We think it must be concluded from the adoption 
statutes of this state that the natural parents have the 
right to withdraw a consent to adoption at any time 
before the rendition of the decree of adoption.'' 
In a recent decision of our own Supreme Court in the 
case of LaPriel Taylor, mother of Howard Wayne, Oinda 
Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen Taynor, Minors, vs. George Q. 
Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, his wife, decided March 3·, 
1952, but not reported, the court held that such a consent could 
be revoked by the natural parents of a child placed for adop-
tion. I quote the words of Justice Wade in his concurring 
opinion: 
"I concur on the ground that plaintiff had effectively 
revoked her consent to the adoption of these children 
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before it was consummated, and there was no showing 
that she had deserted them.'' 
In the same opinion I quote the words of Justice Henriod: 
" ... and second that prior to the filing of the peti-
tion for adoption, the natural mother effectively revok-
ed any consent to adoption that she may have given, 
a right generally conceded under the authorities, when 
applied to the facts of this case." 
There are numerous other authorities of different states 
which hold to this proposition and it would only add a repe-
tition of these holdings which would serve no further purpose 
other than to confirm the above cases and their holdings as cited. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDG-
MENT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE THE CARE AND CUSTODY 
OF HER MINOR CHILD, SALLY ANN DRUCE. 
The proceedings had in this case were certainly not a 
proceeding to determine, by the court, whether the mother 
of this child, appellant herein was a fit and proper person to 
have the custody of her child, nevertheless the court apparently 
proceeding on that theory and while the court was silent in 
its decree on this matter, the court elaborated on the conduct 
of the appellant and in its conclusions of law set forth in para-
graph 3 thereof (Tr. 147): 
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"That Merlyn Druce's moral behavior has not chang-
ed since October 23, 1951, and her financial condition 
has not improved since that time." 
That in paragraph 7 of said findings of fact the court elabo-
rated upon her supposedly misconduct and from such findings 
I am sure, this had a great influence upon the court in rendering 
the decision in denying the appellant the right to revoke her 
consent to adopt (Tr. 145). 
I respectfully ask the court to review the transcript and 
the testimony regarding her supposedly misconduct, as to 
whether, from such evidence she could be adjudged an unfit 
mother to have this child. The most that was said was that 
she married without her grandmother's consent and while 
she was a minor and that she could not get along with her 
grandmother. She was accused of going out and keeping com-
pany with another man while she was still married to Charles 
Druce and keeping late hours and sometimes getting intoxi-
cated and that she married another man before she could get 
a divorce from Charles Druce. The appellant admitted these 
things, but denied positively that she ever had any improper 
relations with these men, other than the fact that, she under 
a mistaken idea, and believing that she was not married to 
Charles Druce, did go through a marriage ceremony with one 
Jack Farrer, but upon discovery of this mistake, there is no 
proof that she continued to live with this man she supposedly 
married, and the findings of fact, set forth this fact that 
she was still continuing to live with this man (Tr-146), 
which the evidence does not support. She loves this man and 
wants to properly marry him, and he wants to properly marry 
her, but cannot do this until she can procure a divorce from 
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Charles Druce, who takes advantage of the fact that he is 
in the army and refuses to do anything to permit her to get 
a divorce from him, although proceedings are now pending 
for this purpose. The said Jack Farrer is able and willing 
to care for her and her child and provide a proper home 
for them. 
Appellant is a victim of unfortunate circumstances. Her 
mother died when she was 6 years old and she never knew 
her father. She was raised by her grandmother, under ap-
parently some hardships and unfortunate circumstances. 
She married while she was 17 years of age (Tr-68). Her 
husband lived with her off and on until the child was born 
and three weeks thereafter deserted her and has never lived 
with her or done anything for her or the child since that time. 
She had to make her own way. She continually quarrelled with 
her grandmother, and her life with her grandmother was 
unbearable to her and she went her own way. She left the 
child with her grandmother because she had no place to take 
it. The grandmother got tired of taking care of the child and 
placed the child with the respondents and promised them she 
would do everything she could to see that they adopted the 
child (Tr-83). 
I respectfully submit, that from the evidence as to the 
conduct of appellant, or misconduct, if it can be construed 
or determined that appellant is or was an unfit person to have 
the custody of her child. 
In the case of Stuber v. Stuber, Case No. 7764, decided 
by this court, but not yet reported as of May 19, 1952, the 
court said: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It was agreed by both counsel at the oral argument 
in this court that since the trial respondent had entered 
into an apparently advantageous marriage to another 
man. The fact that she lived with a man whom she ex-
pected to marry, although censurable, does not in itself 
make her an unfit and improper person to have the 
custody of her child. Citing Walton v. Coffman, 169 
P. 2nd 97. 
Again in Cook v. Cook et al, 248 P. 83 at page 108. Utah. 
"Then too, the unfitness which deprives a parent of 
the right to the custody of a child must be positive, 
and not merely comparative, or merely speculative. 
And too ,as heretofore observed, the referee with re-
spect to this matter had before him the witnesses and 
heard their testimony and found that there was no 
evidence or even a suspiicon of improper relations be-
tween the defendant and Welch. This a finding 
that the defendant is unfit to have the custody of the 
child is not, on the record demanded or justified." 
We think there is nothing in the evidence in this matter 
to justify the lower court in finding that the appellant was not 
a fit and proper person to have the custody of this child. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING 1TS 
JUDGJ\1ENT THAT THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY 
AND WITHOUT COERCION, DURESS OR PERSUASION 
GAVE HER VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO PETITIONERS 
FOR THE ADOPTION OF HER MINOR CHILD. 
In the first place, appellant's child was placed with re-
spondents by her grandmother, without the consent or knowl-
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edge of appellant (Tr. 31). She did not learn of this until 
January of 1951 (Tr. 31). The child was taken by the grand-
mother from a nursery home where appellant had taken her 
and placed with the respondents (Tr. 54). Appellant was try-
ing to support the child to the best of her ability. 
When the respondents decided that they wanted to adopt 
this child, what did they do? They secured their attorney, Mr. 
Young, to contact the appellant to get her consent. Her testi-
mony as outlined in her direct and cross examination and 
contained in (Tr. 26-27-28-31-32-33-34-35-43-44-45-50-51-52, 
etc.), shows that Mr. Young, the respondents and her family 
all worked on appellant to get her to consent to this adoption. 
She repeatedly refused to do so, until they finally persuaded 
her to go before the court and sign a consent. She testified that 
they had worked on her for almost a year by repeatedly con-
tacting her at her work and otherwise, telling her that it was 
for the best interests of the child and that it was selfish of 
her to deprive the child of the comforts and things the mother 
could not give her child (Tr. 33). She further testified that 
the Jacobsens told her they would fight her if she tried to take 
the child out of their home (Tr. 124). She was further told 
that she could not take the child out of the home of respondents 
because of her past actions (Tr. 124). She further testified 
that the respondents even threatened to have her put in jail 
because of her conduct in marrying another man before she 
secured her divorce from Charles Druce. 
After they finally persuaded appellant to go into court 
and sign the consent for adoption, appellant testified as fol-
lows (T. 50): 
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Q. Mrs. Druce, when you appeared in court to sign 
this consent what remark was made by Mr. Young 
after the consent was signed about obtaining the 
consent? 
A. Well, I remember that Mr. Young was awfully glad 
to get it and he had been working some time on it, 
and he said he had been working some time, if 
you remember, Mr. Young; and I believe it is the 
same judge, and you said, "Well, I have been a year 
or approximately a year on this, I should get a 
thousand dollars for it." 
Mr. Young: I still think I would like to have that much. 
I respectfully asked the court if the consent of the ap-
pellant was obtained willingly and without coercion, persua-
sion, undue influence and even resorting to threats. The 
record speaks for itself. The appellant had no money or a 
proper place to take the child. She was torn between two fires. 
Love for her child and its care and custody, and persuasions, 
coercions, undue influence and threats to deprive her of it. 
What could she do or where could she turn, hence the signing 
of the consent. 
Our own Supreme court said in the case of LaPriel Taylor 
et al. v. George Q. Waddoups, supra. Wolfe Chief Justice: 
·'The purpose of this requirement is that the court, 
representing the public, can see that the parents when 
they consent to the adoption of their children are 
informed and fully understand the effect of the act 
which they are performing. The court should endeavor 
to protect the parents from fraud, misrepresentation or 
undue influence in the obtaining of their consent. Oft 
times, consents of adoption are signed by parents while 
under great emotional strain, and, as in this case, they 
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may be signed while the parent is suffering from dis-
couragement and despair. To conduct the welfare 
of all concerned, this safeguard is established as an 
assurance that the parents have duly considered the 
consequences of their act." 
In Bildervack et al v. Clark et al., 189 Pac. 977, Kansas, 
the court said: 
"The natural parent must freely and voluntarily 
consent to the adoption. This consent includes consent 
to all the legal consequences of adoption." 
If for no other reasons than the manner in which this 
consent was obtained, the judgment of the lower could should 
be reversed and the appellant regain the custody of her child. 
Again the hearing on this matter was had, respondents 
obtained the written consent of Charles Druce, the father of 
this child, which consent was filed for record in the court on 
the 25th day of April, 1952. How this consent was obtained 
the record is silent. We conclude from the past actions of said 
Charles Druce in not coming to the assistance of the appel-
lant, supporting her or her child and doing nothing towards 
strtightening out their matters by way. of permitting her to 
obtain a divorce from him by reason of being in the army, that 
his motive in signing this consent was ulterior. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS 
JUDGMENT DENYING THE RIGHT OF THE APPEL-
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LANT TO WITHDRAW HER CONSENT FOR ADOP-
TION OF HER MINOR CHILD BY RESPONDENTS. 
We think we have said enough in the foregoing brief 
under points I, II and III to cover Point IV. We respectfully 
refer the court to the argument and the authorities heretofore 
outlined under Point I hereinbefore set forth, which shows 
that the weight of authority in most jurisdictions permit a 
natural parent to withdraw her consent to adoption and have 
her child restored to her and we could add nothing hereto 
that would not be repetitious, other than citing additional 
authorities to the same effect. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the appellant is entitled to 
a reversal of the lower court's decision in this matter and that 
appellant be permitted to withdraw her consent and regain 
custody of her child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE 
Attorney for Appellant 
1309 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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